Exhibit - Attach to Pleading/Doc(Related Document) - Exhibit 1: Contract July 17, 2024 (2024)

Case

Ts Enterprises LLC Dba American Garage v. Adamo Building Company LLC et al

Jul 15, 2024 |Gary M Kramer |Breach of Contract |2024CV030671

Case

Boren, Logan v. Alexander Moffett Auto Repair et al

Case

Pawnee Leasing Corporation v. Glazier Trucking LLC et al

Case

Dengler, Philip v. Mahler, Sarah

Jul 18, 2024 |Gary M Kramer |Breach of Contract |2024CV030663

Case

Pawnee Leasing Corporation v. Kmk LLC et al

Jul 22, 2024 |Carroll Michelle Brinegar |Breach of Contract |2024CV030623

Case

Bickford, Shana v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co

Jul 23, 2024 |Juan G Villasenor |Breach of Contract |2024CV030637

Case

Lbd LLC v. Fusion Group Inc

Case

Oneill Renovation And Design LLC v. Borders 2 LLC et al

Jul 19, 2024 |Paul R Dunkelman |Breach of Contract |2024CV030157

Ruling

Jul 19, 2024 |CGC23608578

Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Friday, July 19, 2024, Line 8. 2 - DEFENDANT ROUDA FEDER TIETJEN & MCGIUNN's MOTION TO STRIKE 2ND Amended COMPLAINT. Off calendar. No party provided courtesy copies in compliance with SF Local Rule 2.7B. Friday's Law & Motion Calendar will be called out of Dept. 301. Anyone intending to appear in person should report to Dept. 301. However, anyone intending to appear remotely should use the regular Zoom information for Dept. 302's Law & Motion Calendar for 9:30 a.m. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RCE)

Ruling

Tpine Leasing Capital LP., a Delaware limited partnership vs Manvir Singh et al.

Jul 24, 2024 |STK-CV-UBC-2023-0009548

The court having read and considered Defendants' unopposed Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and Proposed Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint filed June 18, 2024 and good cause appearing, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED. Defendants' Answer to be filed within ten court days. Hon. George J. Abdallah, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

TRILLIUM PARTNERS, L.P., A DELAWARE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs NUTRANOMICS, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION

Jul 21, 2024 |CVPS2305959

TRILLIUM PARTNERS, L.P., ADELAWARE LIMITEDCVPS2305959 PARTNERSHIP vs Application for Writ of PossessionNUTRANOMICS, INC., AWYOMING CORPORATIONTentative Ruling: Granted.Trillium’s security interest in the property is a senior security interest to Happy Hours’ implied securityinterest in the property to recover storage costs from the tenant.Court will sign proposed order for writ of possession filed March 8, 2024. However, $50,000.00undertaking will be required pursuant to CCP 515.010 within 10 days of this order becoming final forclerk to issue the writ of possession.Moving party to provide notice pursuant to CCP 1019.5.From April 2022 to July 2022 defendant Nutranomics Inc. entered into a series of loans with plaintiffTrillium Partners L.P., under which Trillium lent Nutranomics something in the neighborhood of$1,660,000. On each loan Trillium took a security interest in certain property owned by Nutranomics.Nutranomics fell into default, and in addition in August of 2023 was evicted from the tenancy at whichthe property was held by its landlord, defendant Happy Hours LLC. As a result of the eviction, HappyHours is now in possession of the security on the Trillium loans. Trillium filed this action against HappyHours and Nutranomics. Happy Hours initially defaulted but has obtained relief from that and hasanswered the complaint, while Nutranomics and a third defendant, DHS Development, have beenserved; Nutranomics is currently in default.Trillium now seeks a writ of possession as to the secured equipment, which Happy Hours opposes.Writ of PossessionUpon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, a plaintiff may apply for a writ of possession.(Cal. Code Civ. Pro § 512.010(a). The application shall include all of the following:1. A showing of the basis of the plaintiff’s claim that the plaintiff is entitled to possession, includingthe written instrument;2. A showing that the property is wrongfully detained by defendant and of the manner in whichdefendant came into possession and the reason for the detention;3. A particular description of the property and a statement of its value;4. A statement of the property’s location based on plaintiff’s knowledge, information and belief; and5. A statement that the property has not been taken for a tax, assessment or fine pursuant to astatute; or seized under an execution against the property; or if so seized, that it is by statuteexempt from such seizure.(C.C.P. §512.010(b).) The court may order the defendant to transfer possession of the property to theplaintiff. (C.C.P. §512.070.) The property sought to be recovered must exist in a concrete or tangibleform, capable of identification and seizure and the writ does not issue for intangibles such as bankaccounts. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023) §9:768.)in addition to establishing the probable validity of the claim of possession, in order to obtain a writ ofpossess or TRO, Petitioner must post a bond that is equal to twice the value of Respondent’s interestin the property, which is the market value less amounts of liens or balances due under the conditionalsales contracts or security agreements. (C.C.P. §515.010(a).)At or after the time a plaintiff files an application for writ of possession, he or she may apply for atemporary restraining order if: (1) the plaintiff has established the probable validity of his claim topossession of the property; (2) the plaintiff has provided an undertaking; (3) the plaintiff has establishedthe probability that there is an immediate danger that the property claimed may become unavailable tolevy by reason of being transferred, concealed, or removed or may become substantially impaired invalue. (C.C.P. §513.010.)The party requesting a writ of possession must establish the probable validity of his or her claim topossession of the property, which means that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain ajudgment against the defendant on the claim. (RCA Service Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 137Cal.App.3d 1, 3.) The defendant may not retain wrongful possession of property even if he or she hasa valid claim for damages against the plaintiff. (RCA Service Co., 137 Cal.App.3d 1, 3.)Here, the procedural requirements of the application have been met and plaintiff’s claim obviously hasprobable validity over Nutranomics, which is in default. The question raised by the parties is whetherHappy Hours claim for storage fees has priority over Trillium’s right to repossess the collateral. UnderC.C.P. §1174(h), if personal property is left on rental property after execution of an unlawful detainerjudgment, “[t]he landlord shall release the personal property pursuant to Section 1965 of the Civil Codeor shall release it to the tenant or, at the landlord’s option, to a person reasonably believed by thelandlord to be its owner if the tenant or other person pays the costs of storage as provided in Section1990 of the Civil Code and claims the property not later than the date specified in the writ of possessionbefore which the tenant must make his or her claim or the date specified in the notice before which aperson other than the tenant must make his or her claim.”Early versions of the statute were either silent as to what to do with the tenant’s property or requiredthe county to store leftover property; “[t]he 1968 amendment with which we are here concerned shiftedthe duty of storing the tenant’s property to the plaintiff landlord and provides that the reasonable costsof storage incurred by the landlord are to be reimbursed to him either by the tenant, if the property isredeemed by him, or out of the proceeds realized upon a public sale of the property if it is not redeemedby the tenant as prescribed in the statute.” (Gray v. Whitmore (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1, 15.) Under thestatute “a deposit for purposes of storage is created by the terms of the statute and the landlordbecomes a depositary for the safekeeping of the property for the benefit of the tenant.” (Gray, 17Cal.App.3d 1, 16.) “To secure the payment of such compensation section 1174, in essence, gives theplaintiff a special lien on the property dependent on possession.” (Gray, 17 Cal.App.3d 1, 16.)Insofar as the landlord has something in the nature of a lien on the property, however, there is no reasonto conclude that the landlord’s lien is senior to an earlier created security interest in favor of plaintiffhere. In general, conflicting security interests are ranked in priority of time of filing or perfection.(Commercial Code §9322.) There are various exceptions but nothing in the language of C.C.P. §1174or Civil Code §1965 suggest that an interest of a landlord as depository achieves priority over existingsecurity interests in property.The language of section 1174(h) only suggests a right to recover costs of deposit from the tenant or bythe owner of the property being held. Trillium, it bears noting, is neither of these. It is the holder of asecurity interest in the property, while Nutranomics remains both the tenant and the owner of theproperty. Like any other person taking a junior interest in a security, Happy Hours runs the risk of havingits interest in the security extinguished by a senior security interest; this does not give it the right towithhold the property from the holder of senior security interest. Neither of Happy Hours’ briefs provideany argument as to why a section 1174 interest in the property should be deemed superior to apreexisting security interest, nor does it analyze the statutory language in any way that explains whythe holder of a senior security interest should be required to pay the tenant’s storage expenses beforeseizing or foreclosing on the property.Also troublesome is Happy Hours’ claim that it has incurred storage costs of $900,266.22 from theAugust 2023 eviction through April 19, 2024. (Nichani declaration, ¶8.) By Happy Hours’ own account,this is $4,142.67 per day. (Opposition to Writ of Possession, p. 6.) There is no explanation for whystorage costs are so high—no description of the property being held, its size or any special needs inmaintaining it, no calculation performed or explained. The size of the storage space is not given. Abald statement that the storage costs are $124,280 a month, without any further explanation, has noevidentiary value to the court in attempting to determine a reasonable bond to require.

Ruling

GESKE'S GENERAL ENGINEERING, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION VS WICKHAM GROUP, LLC A LIMITED LIABILITY CORPORATION IN CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

Jul 18, 2024 |23SMCV00432

Case Number: 23SMCV00432 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: P Tentative Ruling Geskes General Engineering, Inc. v. Wickham Group, LLC, et al. Case No. 23SMCV00432 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Defendant Timothy Wickhams Motion for Stay Pending Resolution of Criminal Charges Plaintiff Geskes General Engineering sued Wickham Group, Inc., William Wickham, Wickham Group, LLC, Timothy Wickham and Tyerman for claims arising out of alleged failure to pay for subcontracting services on a residential construction project. Homeowner Tyerman cross-complained against plaintiff and defendants for negligence, breach of contract, express indemnity and disgorgement. Defendant Wickham is charged with theft of funds from Tyerman in a pending criminal matter, Case No. 23VWCF00089-01. Def. Motion, p. 5; Burns Decl. ¶3. Timothy Wickham moves to stay this matter pending resolution of the criminal matter. Evidentiary Objections Tyerman Objections: Objections 1-2 SUSTAINED (lack of personal knowledge); Objections 3, 6 SUSTAINED (speculation); Objection 4 OVERRULED; Objection 5 SUSTAINED (lack of foundation). Motion for Stay An application for a stay is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Thomson v. Continental Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 738, 746. An order staying discovery until determination of criminal charges allows plaintiff to prepare his or her action while alleviating [defendants] difficult choice between defending either the civil or criminal case. Pacers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 686, 690. Neither the U.S. nor California constitutions require a stay of civil proceedings pending the outcome of criminal proceedings, but trial courts have discretion to stay if there would be substantial prejudice to the rights of the parties involved and when interests of justice require. Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision (9th Cir. 1995) 45 F.3d 322, 324; see also, People v. Coleman, (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 885; Alpha Media Resort Inv. Cases (2019) 39 Ca1.App.5th 1121, 1131-1133; Avant! Corp. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 876, 882. The court has an interest in expeditiously processing matters, so convenience of the courts is best served when motions to stay proceedings are discouraged. Alpha, supra, at 1132, quoting Avant!, supra, at 888. Indeed, California courts are guided by the strong principle that any elapsed time other than that reasonably required for pleadings and discovery is unacceptable and should be eliminated. Id., quoting Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin. §2. Per Evidence Code sec. 940, civil defendants may refuse to disclose self-incriminating information in discovery when facing criminal prosecution involving the same facts that may be used against them in criminal proceedings. Pacers, supra, at 688. To not penalize civil defendants from exercising their privilege against self-incrimination by making them choose between silence and a meaningful chance of avoiding the loss through judicial process of a substantial amount of property, when confronted with this issue, trial courts should stay discovery pending expiration of the criminal statute of limitations or resolution of the criminal case. Id. at 688-690. Wickham argues the following factors weigh in favor of a stay: (1) the interest of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with this litigation or any particular aspect of it, and the potential prejudice to plaintiffs of a delay; (2) the burden which any particular aspect of the proceedings may impose on defendants; (3) the convenience of the court in the management of its cases, and the efficient use of judicial resources; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the interest of the public in the pending civil and criminal litigation. Avant!, supra, at 885. Wickham argues his Fifth Amendment rights are implicated, as the cases involve the same allegations and facts, so he cannot respond to discovery without forfeiting his Fifth Amendment rights. The motion cites specific discovery requests which Wickham argues implicate his Fifth Amendment rights. Tyerman argues Wickham may assert his Fifth Amendment rights in response to individual items of discovery but alleges most issues in this action are unrelated to the criminal matter. In reviewing the discovery, it appears most of the requests for admission do not pertain to events that are the subject of the criminal matter, Wickhams alleged theft from Tyerman. Defendant provided the court with examples of specific information sought which might implicate his Fifth Amendment rights, but this is by no means the entirety of the discovery propounded upon him. Per Evidence Code section 940, nothing prevents Wickham from objecting to individual discovery requests based on his Fifth Amendment rights if the information sought may reasonably be used against him in the criminal matter. The court recognizes the parties strong in proceeding expeditiously with this litigation. Staying this matter indefinitely pending outcome of the criminal matter may prejudice plaintiff and cross-complainant, who wish to have their claims adjudicated. Further, other defendants who do not face criminal prosecution, including the entity defendants, can respond to and participate in discovery fully. The entity defendants do not have Fifth Amendment privileges, are not the subject of criminal prosecution, and may respond to discovery. The request to stay is overbroad and implicates the rights of all parties. Wickhams Fifth Amendment rights can be protected via a more limited means objection to individual items of discovery on privilege grounds. DENIED.

Ruling

PAOLA MELGAR VS EAST LA AUTO SALES, INC

Jul 18, 2024 |24STCV08590

Case Number: 24STCV08590 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING PAOLA MELGAR, vs. EAST LA AUTO SALES, INC. Case No.: 24STCV08590 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Cross-Defendant Paola Melgars demurrer to Cross-Complainant East LA Auto Sales, Inc.s cross-complaint is sustained. Cross-Defendant Paola Melgar (Melgar) (Cross-Defendant) demurs to Cross-Complainant East LA Auto Sales, Inc.s (East LA) (Cross-Complainant) cross-complaint (CC) on the following grounds: (1) the 1st cause of action for breach of contract does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; and (2) the 2nd cause of action for negligence does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Notice of Demurrer, pg. 1.) Meet and Confer Before filing a demurrer, the moving party must meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing the demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41, emphasis added.) Cross-Defendants counsel declares that at least five days before the date the responsive pleading date was due to be filed, he met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading, and they did not reach an agreement resolving the matters raised in the demurrer. (See Decl. of Rose ¶2a.) Cross-Defendants counsels declaration is insufficient under C.C.P. §430.41 because his declaration does not state that the parties met and conferred in person, by telephone, or by video conference. However, the failure to sufficiently meet and confer is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(4); Dumas v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 348, 355; Olson v. Hornbrook Community Services District (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 502, 515.) Accordingly, the Court will consider Cross-Defendants demurrer. Background Cross-Complainant filed the operative CC on May 8, 2024, against Cross-Defendant alleging two causes of action: (1) breach of contract; and (2) negligence. Cross-Complainants causes of action arise from its entry into a Retail Installment Sale Contract (Contract) with Cross-Defendant on August 16, 2022, in which Cross-Complainant agreed to purchase a used 2009 BMW (Subject Vehicle). (See CC ¶5.) Cross-Defendant filed the instant demurrer on June 10, 2024. Cross-Complainant filed its opposition on July 3, 2024, and filed a second opposition on July 5, 2024. Cross-Defendant filed her reply on July 8, 2024. Summary of Demurrer Cross-Defendant demurs to the 1st and 2nd causes of action on the basis the claims fail to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action. (Demurrer, pg. 3.) Legal Standard [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Failure to State a Claim Breach of Contract (1st COA) To prevail on a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove (1) the contract, (2) plaintiffs performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendants breach, and (4) resulting damage to the plaintiff. (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) Cross-Complainant alleges on August 16, 2022, Cross-Defendant entered into the Contract with Cross-Complainant in which Cross-Defendant agreed to purchase the Subject Vehicle from Cross-Defendant. (CC ¶5, Exh. A.) Cross-Complainant alleges it performed all of its obligations under the Contract. (CC ¶6.) Cross-Complainant alleges in ¶2, §2 of the Contract, Cross-Defendant agreed not to expose the Subject Vehicle to misuse. (CC ¶7.) Cross-Complainant alleges on or about October 2022, Cross-Defendant poured coolant into the Subject Vehicles engine, causing damage to the Subject Vehicle. (CC ¶8.) Cross-Complainant alleges it suffered harm and damages as a result of Cross-Defendants conduct. (CC ¶9.) Nonetheless, Cross-Complainant does not sufficiently how Cross-Defendants pouring coolant into the Subject Vehicle constitutes a breach of the Contract, nor how Cross-Complainant suffered any affirmative damages thereby. Accordingly, Cross-Defendants demurrer to Cross-Complainants 1st cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Negligence (2nd COA) The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are (a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury. (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917, internal quotations omitted.) The first element, duty, may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship. (Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Association, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1128 [214 Cal.Rptr.3d 552].) [T]he existence of a duty is a question of law for the court. (Kentucky Fried Chicken of California v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 814, 819.) Cross-Complainant alleges Cross-Defendant owed Cross-Complainant a duty of care not to subject the Subject Vehicle to misuse. (CC ¶15.) Cross-Complainant alleges in October 2022, Cross-Defendant breached the duty of care owed to Cross-Complainant by pouring coolant into the Subject Vehicles engine, causing damage to the Subject Vehicle, causing harm to Cross-Complainant. (CC ¶16.) Cross-Complainant alleges Cross-Defendants conduct was the proximate cause and cause in fact in causing harm and damages to Cross-Complainant. (CC ¶17.) Cross-Complainant alleges as a result of Cross-Defendants breach, Cross-Complainant sustained general and specific damages in an amount to be determined at trial. (CC ¶18.) Cross-Complainant fails to allege a legal duty owed by Cross-Defendant to Cross-Complainant. Specifically, Cross-Complainant fails to allege a legally cognizable duty a buyer owes to a seller to not subject the Subject Vehicle to misuse. Accordingly, Cross-Defendants demurrer to Cross-Complainants 2nd cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Conclusion The Court observes that absent allegations of affirmative damages, the causes of action pled in the Cross-Complaint appear more appropriately pled as affirmative defenses. Cross-Defendants demurrer to Cross-Complainant is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

United Business Bank vs. Lynne Bui

Jul 22, 2024 |C23-02049

C23-02049CASE NAME: UNITED BUSINESS BANK VS. LYNNE BUI*HEARING ON MOTION FOR DISCOVERY COMPELLING DEFTKHLORIS BIOSCIENCES TO PROVIDEFURTHER RESPONSE, PRODUCE ALL RESPONSIVE DOCS, PROVIDE PRIVILEGE LOG FILED BYPLAINTIFFFILED BY:*TENTATIVE RULING:*Pursuant to a prior notice of stay of proceedings filed by plaintiff, a stay was filed in this lawsuit onNovember 30, 2023. The court is aware of no further action concerning this stay. As a result,plaintiff’s motion is off calendar.

Ruling

JOHNSON, ET AL VS. PARENT, ETAL

Jul 24, 2024 |CVCV21-0197618

JOHNSON, ET AL VS. PARENT, ETALCase Number: CVCV21-0197618This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of arbitration. The Court ordered this matter to arbitrationon February 5, 2024. Neither side appeared for the prior hearing on May 3, 2024. The Court notes thatSubstitutions of Attorney have been filed on behalf of Plaintiffs. An appearance is necessary on today’scalendar to discuss the status of arbitration.

Ruling

Jul 22, 2024 |C24-00327

C24-00327CASE NAME: DISCOVERY REALTY INC. VS. SEECON FINANCIAL & CONSTRUCTION INC.HEARING IN RE: COMPLEX DESIGNATIONFILED BY:*TENTATIVE RULING:*See Line 2.

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Api Group Life Safety Usa LLC v. Arco National Living Group LLC et al

Jul 18, 2024 |Michael A. O'hara III |Mechanic's Lien |2024CV030059

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Pecha, Forrest et al v. Seely Wydra, Rebecca et al

Jul 20, 2024 |Michael A. O'hara III |Breach of Contract |2024CV030060

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Sep 22, 2020 |Mary C. Hoak |Other |2020CV030070

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Pecha, Forrest et al v. Seely Wydra, Rebecca et al

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Jul 18, 2024 |Michael A. O'hara III |Mechanic's Lien |2024CV030059